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David Hall
A central puzzle for environmental economics is how to 
integrate long-run costs and benefits into present-day 
decision making. Commonly this puzzle is described in terms 
of externalities. These occur when ‘an activity or transaction 
by some party causes an unintended loss or gain in welfare to 
another party, and no compensation for the change in welfare 
occurs’ (Daly and Farley, 2011, p.184). For example, the 
millions of tonnes of carbon dioxide that a large coal-fired 
power plant releases annually contributes to the cumulative 
problem of climate change, yet those who profit from 
producing electricity do not bear the burden of the negative 
consequences. Rather, these 
costs fall disproportionately 
upon future generations 
and communities uniquely 
vulnerable to the impacts 
of climate change. Thus, the 
emission of greenhouse gases 
creates a negative externality, 
because its costly impacts are 
external to the accounting of 
the actors who emit them. 
In this way, market mechanisms 
produce market failures, with grave 
implications for the environment. 
Professor Lord Nicholas Stern famously 
described climate change as ‘the greatest 
market failure the world has seen’ (Stern, 
2007). Other examples include the 
degradation of freshwater or soil resources, 
air pollution, overfishing and mass 
deforestation. What is economically 
rational from the perspective of short-
David Hall is a senior researcher for the Policy Observatory at the Auckland University of Technology, 
and a roving editor for BWB Texts.
Greening the 
Future: a case for 
environmental  
impact bonds
Page 42 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 13, Issue 2 – May 2017
term capital gain is economically irrational 
from the perspective of long-term 
prosperity. The same problem also hinders 
remedial action: the costs of interventions 
are immediate, whereas the avoided costs 
of environmental damage are months, 
years, even decades away.
This challenge is not unique to 
environmental economics, moreover. As 
Jonathan Boston describes, there are a 
range of societal problems which ‘entail 
non-simultaneous exchanges’, in 
anticipation of which ‘elected officials 
must impose near-term costs in order to 
deliver net long-term gains’ (Boston, 
2017, p.465). These include decisions of 
fiscal responsibility, health problems with 
delayed impacts on public health 
infrastructure, such as obesity and 
smoking, underinvestment in public 
infrastructure which retards economic 
productivity, and social problems that 
perpetuate the intergenerational transfer 
of poverty. 
Given that these problems share a 
common payoff structure, it is plausible 
that solutions which make sense in one 
policy domain will translate effectively 
into another. For example, a central 
insight of the social investment approach 
to New Zealand’s welfare system is that 
long-run costs can be pre-empted and 
obviated by targeted interventions in the 
short term, thereby reducing the state’s 
‘forward liability’ – that is, the cumulative 
present and future welfare expenditure. 
Colin James has noted in passing that this 
social investment logic translates very 
easily into environmental policy (James, 
2015, p.2). The estimated future costs of 
environmental harms could be used to 
justify the immediate expense of 
mitigating those harms. The growing 
literature on ecosystem services – that is, 
the pricing of environmental functions in 
respect to their human value – provides 
the informational resources to generate 
projections for the forward liability of the 
status quo (for literature reviews with a 
New Zealand focus, see McAlpine and 
Wotton, 2009; Dymond, 2013; and 
Roberts et al., 2015).
This article examines whether social 
impact bonds (SIBs) might fruitfully 
translate into the environmental domain. 
SIBs can be regarded as an auxiliary to the 
social investment approach, as an 
outcomes-oriented financial instrument 
that is partially justified by the same 
imperatives used to justify the social 
investment approach, particularly the 
imperatives to reduce public sector 
expenditure and to shift service delivery 
to the non-governmental sector. I 
conclude that the SIB model is feasible for 
environmental interventions, and that, 
indeed, the shift from social to 
environmental outcomes might sidestep 
some of the ethical and methodological 
challenges that social impact bonds face. 
Impact bonds: an emerging empirical record
This section describes social impact bonds 
from an advocate’s perspective. (A critical 
perspective is taken below.) I focus on two 
reports. The first, Social Impact Bonds: 
the early years (Dear et al., 2016), was 
published in July 2016 by Social Finance, 
an economic think tank which pioneered 
the SIB model with the Peterborough 
Prison bond (2010–15), widely recognised 
as the world’s first. The second report is 
The Potential and Limitations of Impact 
Bonds: lessons from the first five years 
of experience worldwide, published 
in November 2015 by the Brookings 
Institution in Washington (Gustaffson-
Wright, Gardiner and Putcha, 2015).
What makes these reports interesting 
is that they both draw on empirical 
insights from the original cohort of SIBs. 
So, while SIBs have heretofore been 
promoted on a priori expectations, these 
reports constitute the beginnings of an ex 
post evaluation. Nevertheless, as the 
reports’ authors readily acknowledge, 
these empirical insights are still partial 
and incomplete, so we ought not suspend 
our scepticism entirely.
Social Finance provides this neat 
definition:
At its core, a Social Impact Bond is a 
public-private partnership which 
funds effective social services through 
a performance-based contract. Social 
Impact Bonds enable federal, state, 
and local governments to partner 
with high-performing service 
providers by using private investment 
to develop, coordinate, or expand 
effective programs. If, following 
measurement and evaluation, the 
program achieves predetermined 
outcomes and performance metrics, 
then the outcomes payor repays the 
original investment. However, if the 
program does not achieve its expected 
results, the payor does not pay for 
unmet metrics and outcomes. (Dear 
et al., 2016, p.12)
In other words, an outcome funder – 
typically a government – identifies a social 
problem that might benefit from 
outcomes-based funding. An inter-
mediary organisation is tasked with 
structuring a deal, based on pay-for-
performance contracts between the 
outcome funder, investors, service 
providers and evaluators. Investors pay a 
principal which is used as upfront capital 
by not-for-profits, social enterprises or 
other community organisations to fund 
service delivery. Evaluators then assess 
whether the service outcomes meet 
agreed-upon impact targets. If they do, 
then the outcome funder is obliged to pay 
the principal plus coupon to the investors 
in accordance with the pay-for-
performance contracts upon bond 
maturity. 
Social Finance’s survey finds that, as of 
June 2016, there were 60 SIBs launched 
variously in the United Kingdom, United 
States, Australia, Germany, the 
... an outcome funder – typically a 
government – identifies a social problem 
that might benefit from outcomes-based 
funding.
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Netherlands, Belgium, Canada, Portugal, 
India, Switzerland, Austria, Israel, Finland 
and Sweden. These SIBs raised over 
US$200 million of capital combined, and 
affected over 90,000 people through 
service delivery (ibid., p.25). Not captured 
in this survey, however, are the SIB pilots 
which were initiated but not completed, 
and therefore are unaccounted for, some 
abandoned, others still under negotiation. 
This includes the Ministry of Health bond 
in New Zealand, which was launched in 
late 2013 but stalled in May 2016 when the 
provider withdrew (Treasury and Ministry 
of Health, 2016). Such projects are not 
failures per se; they could equally be seen 
as victims of a selection process which 
sorts out adequate from inadequate SIB 
proposals.
As for the active SIBs, both reports are 
cautiously positive about the success of 
these instruments. The Brookings 
Institution report – which drew on 
structured interviews and online surveys 
of contracted parties for the first 38 SIBs 
up to 1 March 2015 – concluded that ‘it is 
very likely that the impact bond model 
development process, structure, and 
application will continue to be adapted in 
the future’ (Gustafsson-Wright, Gardiner 
and Putcha, 2015, p.50). Over a year later, 
Social Finance reported ‘a promising, if 
early, record of success’, while 
acknowledging that this is based on 
‘interim, not final, results’ (Dear et al., 
2016, p.26). It found that 22 SIBs had 
reported performance data, 21 indicated 
positive social outcomes, 12 made 
outcome payments and four fully repaid 
investor capital (ibid., p.6).
The Brookings Institution report 
evaluates the success of SIBs in relation to 
‘ten common claims’, several of which 
were reinforced by practical experience 
(Gustafsson-Wright, Gardiner and 
Putcha, 2015, pp.36-47): namely, that (1) 
impact bonds prioritise prevention rather 
than remedial interventions; (2) impact 
bonds shift focus to outcomes by identifying 
impact targets that trigger payment; (3) 
impact bonds crowd-in private funding 
from both new investors and traditional 
providers of social grants; (4) impact 
bonds improve performance management 
by inviting private sector expertise in 
monitoring success; (5) impact bonds 
stimulate collaboration between 
stakeholders in the private, public and 
non-governmental sectors; and (6) impact 
bonds reduce risk for government because 
public money is used only to reward 
successful outcomes, while private 
investors bear the burden of failure. 
Two further common claims were less 
clear. At the time of the survey it was too 
soon to say whether (7) impact bonds 
build a culture of monitoring and evaluation 
and (8) impact bonds sustain impact over 
long time frames. However, the interviews 
uncovered optimism in regards to both. 
The claims least supported by early 
evidence were (9) impact bonds foster 
innovation in delivery and (10) impact 
bonds achieve scale. In regards to 
innovation, there was no evidence that 
SIBs had prompted entirely novel models 
of service delivery – which is hardly 
surprising given the risk for investors – 
although there was evidence that 
conventional models were being applied 
in novel combinations, novel settings and 
novel target populations. In regard to 
scale, there was no evidence that SIBs were 
scalable in an absolute sense, where they 
could be replicated nationwide to address 
large-scale social problems. Indeed, the 
success of certain SIBs was contingent on 
them targeting a very specific population 
(ibid., p.42). However, the report notes 
that more modest forms of scalability are 
plausible. The Social Finance report 
further observes ‘signs of standardization 
in the field, with programs being replicated 
and adapted to multiple geographies’ 
(Dear et al., 2016, p.8).
From social to environmental
What then of environmental impact bonds 
(EIBs)? The adaptation of the impact bond 
structure for environmental outcomes 
was hypothesised in 2013 by David Nicola. 
He notes that ‘[m]onetization of future 
cost savings is a staple of environmental 
finance’ and therefore well served by an 
impact bond where ‘investors are paid 
a return based on the amount of cost 
savings generated by a particular project’ 
(Nicola, 2013, p.14). Cost savings are 
expected to emerge from private sector 
involvement, especially from the capacity 
for innovation and private sector rigour 
in the delivery of interventions.
One such bond was issued on 29 
September 2016 by District of Columbia 
Water and Sewer Authority (DC Water). 
This is billed as the US’s first EIB and will 
manage storm water through the 
installation of green infrastructure. There 
is a mandatory tender set for 1 April 2021, 
when investors will receive either a US$3.3 
million coupon if storm water runoff is 
reduced by over 41.3%; receive no coupon 
if runoff is reduced by 18.6%–41.3%; or 
pay a ‘risk share payment’ of US$3.3 
million if runoff is reduced by less than 
18.6%. This structure enables DC Water 
to prove the effectiveness of green 
infrastructure even while it is constrained 
from investing public money in risky or 
unproven solutions, because the EIB 
redistributes the risk of outright failure 
onto investors, in this case Goldman Sachs 
and the Calvert Foundation (Martin, 
2017).
Another EIB in the US – still in pilot 
phase – is a forest resilience bond being 
developed by Blue Forest Conservation. 
This is designed to provide upfront capital 
for forest restoration, particularly the 
clearing of forest litter to reduce the risk 
and severity of wildfires. The principal 
outcome funder is the United States Forest 
Service, which can justify this immediate 
investment insofar as it reduces the 
The primary justification for the proposed 
permanent forest bond is that forest can 
be established more cost effectively by 
the private sector under an outcomes-
based contract, ... 
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expected future budget for firefighting 
(Yonavjak, 2016; Blue Forest Conserva-
tion, 2017). This is transparently a forward 
liability approach, although aimed at 
reducing future government expenditure 
on nature conservation rather than social 
welfare.
This author has explored the potential 
for EIBs in New Zealand to establish new 
permanent forest (Hall, Lindsay and Judd, 
2017). The primary justification for the 
proposed permanent forest bond is that 
forest can be established more cost 
effectively by the private sector under an 
outcomes-based contract, because the EIB 
model accommodates innovation and 
optimal management procedures to 
produce those outcomes. The secondary 
justification is a forward liability logic 
which accounts for the ecosystem services 
that forests provide, as well as the long-
run costs of leaving large tracts of land 
unforested when it is erosion-prone or 
located in sensitive water catchments. 
From this long-term perspective, the 
immediate cost of permanent forest 
planting can be justified in terms of 
avoiding the relatively larger costs of non-
forest land uses which promote freshwater 
deterioration from sediment and nutrient 
runoff, private and public property 
damage from erosion and landslips, and 
future expenses for purchasing carbon 
offsets from foreign markets to meet 
international climate obligations. Because 
these long-run costs are largely 
externalities that fall upon the wider 
community and future generations, the 
most appropriate outcome funders are 
identified as national or local governments 
acting on behalf of the Crown. By issuing 
permanent forest bonds, the Crown 
invests in long-term prosperity through a 
structure that prioritises cost-effective 
interventions. The attractions for other 
stakeholders are, for retail and institutional 
investors, a green investment proposition 
with measurable impacts; and for 
prospective tree-planters an opportunity 
to access untapped private capital (see 
Figure 1).
The bond structure is particularly 
well-suited for afforestation and reforesta-
tion, because forests involve large-scale 
investment and relatively long timescales 
(Cranford et al., 2011). However, EIBs 
could conceivably be used to address 
other environmental issues, wherever 
there is the right coalition of interests. The 
key questions to ask are: 
•	 Do	outcome	funders	(such	as	the	
Crown) stand to reduce long-run 
costs by intervening in this 
environmental issue? And do they 
stand to reduce the immediate costs 
of intervention by outsourcing 
delivery to the non-governmental 
sector?
•	 Do	prospective	investors	have	capital	
available that they are unwilling to 
donate philanthropically, but would 
be willing to invest under the 
expectation of a return on investment 
that is contingent on impact 
performance? Do investors have 
access to adequate scientific 
knowledge, and sufficient trust in 
other stakeholders, to justify the 
investment risk?
•	 Do	contractors	(or	service	providers)	
currently lack access to upfront 
capital due to the non-simultaneous 
exchange of investment and outcome? 
Are contractors willing and able to 
operate under the rigour of impact 
targets?
Figure 1: Schema for a permanent forest bond
Source: Hall, Lindsay and Judd, 2017
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Accordingly, EIBs could be established 
to address other environmental problems 
where the measurement of impacts, and 
where relationships of cause and effect, 
are uncontroversial to a degree that is 
mutually acceptable to the contracting 
parties. For example, it is plausible to 
imagine: an EIB for water quality that 
encompasses not only revegetation but 
also wider land use strategies and further 
technologies to reduce effluent and 
sediment runoff; an EIB for the eradication 
of herbivorous pests that relies on carbon 
measurement of forest ecosystems to 
evaluate impact; or an EIB that increases 
average rates of soil carbon per hectare by 
funding the transition to innovative 
pastoral regimes. By contrast, it is less 
plausible to imagine the successful 
negotiation of EIBs for problems where 
measurement is controversial (such as 
changes to fish stocks) or where causal 
relationships are subject to irreducible 
uncertainty and complexity (such as air 
quality or coral bleaching). That said, 
technological advances in measurement 
and monitoring could overcome these 
problems.
An environmental advantage?
From an a priori perspective, there is little 
reason to anticipate that the purported 
merits of SIBs, if valid in the social 
domain, would not be replicated in the 
environmental domain. These merits are 
intrinsic to the impact structure itself, 
not the object of impact, so should be 
no less relevant for EIBs than for SIBs. 
Fundamentally, this structure is about 
shifting risk onto the seller, rather than 
the buyer, of outcomes.1 The purpose of 
this redistribution of risk is to reorganise 
stakeholder incentives in such a way 
that intervention becomes an attractive 
proposition, prompting stakeholders to 
fund an intervention that would otherwise 
not be funded. 
Nevertheless, there are important 
differences between SIBs and EIBs which 
have implications for their feasibility. 
Basically, SIBs focus on social systems and 
their constituent elements, whereas EIBs 
focus on ecosystems and their constituent 
elements. This means that the specific 
challenges of social measurement, social 
explanation and social prediction are 
central to the design of SIBs in a way that 
they are not for EIBs. Of course, it would 
be imprudent to draw this distinction too 
starkly, because measurement, explanation 
and prediction in the physical sciences are 
not without their challenges and 
controversies. Moreover, understanding 
ecosystems in this Anthropocene era of 
pervasive human influence involves, in 
part, understanding how ecosystems 
interrelate with human systems (Sarewitz 
and Pielke Jr, 2000, pp.12-15): for instance, 
how human economies influence resource 
use and how anthropogenic global 
warming adjusts inputs for local 
ecosystems. Nevertheless, when it comes 
to measuring impacts and predicting 
causal effects, an EIB can always narrow 
down its focus to basic scientific laws or 
correlations. By contrast, SIBs must 
necessarily focus on human subjects, who 
have a capacity for linguistic and reflexive 
thought that non-human phenomena do 
not. This entails a host of ethical and 
practical issues that are either absent from 
measuring environmental impact, or can 
be constrained or compensated for.
Thus, if we look beyond the advocates’ 
view of SIBs and toward the critics’, we see 
points where EIBs might sidestep some of 
the problems faced by SIBs. For example, 
one important critique of SIBs is that 
‘social outcomes are notoriously difficult 
to measure’ (McHugh et al., 2013, p.249). 
This has several implications. First, this 
makes it more difficult to agree to 
appropriate outcome targets in the 
negotiation phase. Second, if targets are 
agreed to, there is greater potential for 
disagreement over whether outcome 
targets were met, which could lead to 
disputes over payment. Third, this 
increases the likelihood that an evaluative 
framework will need to be tailor-made: 
‘“Off the shelf” measures do not exist for 
many of the social outcomes which SIBs 
aim to effect and proxies or new indicators 
would have to be used’ (ibid.). Finally, 
these various complications will add to 
the transaction costs required for 
establishing the bond, particularly for 
identifying impact targets and methods 
for evaluation.
These are all genuine problems for 
SIBs; but note that these objections carry 
less weight for EIBs. There already exist a 
range of standardised tools and methods 
for environmental monitoring and 
evaluation which an EIB can piggyback 
on, thereby avoiding the time and costs of 
developing original metrics (Nicola, 2013, 
p.27). For example, the Resource 
Management Act 1991 imposes a 
responsibility upon local authorities to 
monitor the human impacts on natural 
and physical resources, such as 
contamination of land, air and water; soil 
conservation; water quality and quantity; 
and coastal marine areas. The tools, 
technologies and limits used to fulfil these 
responsibilities could be co-opted into 
EIBs. Further targets and measures could 
be adapted from the Ministry for the 
Environment’s national environmental 
standards, the national policy statement 
for freshwater management, and other 
central government systems for 
monitoring and evaluation. Furthermore, 
there are a range of international standards 
and criteria, such as the quality assurance 
and quality control (QA/QC) 
infrastructure within carbon credit 
standards, which could also be utilised for 
establishing an EIB.
... the establishment of [environmental 
impact bonds] is plausibly less resource 
intensive than of [social impact 
bonds], because tools and methods for 
environmental monitoring and evaluation 
often already exist.
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Not only are there well-established 
measures within the environmental 
domain, but also well-established revenue 
streams, some of which are not 
government-dependent (ibid.). SIBs tend 
to rely on government as the primary 
source of payments, insofar as government 
pays for outcomes to reduce its forward 
liabilities in social welfare, public health 
or criminal justice. Yet EIBs tend to focus 
on natural assets that often generate 
revenue streams that are independent of 
government payments, such as timber, 
water, fish stocks, and carbon for 
voluntary markets. Some of these revenue 
streams will also be realisable within a 
time frame that isn’t unusual for 
government-issued bonds; Climate Bonds 
Initiative (2016, p.5) notes that 70% of 
existing climate-aligned bonds have 
tenures (time to maturity) of ten years or 
more. Moreover, opportunities for market 
revenue do not preclude an EIB from also 
tapping into government systems of 
payment for ecosystem services, such as 
subsidies for erosion control, payments 
for biodiversity conservation, and carbon 
credits for compliance markets such as 
New Zealand’s emissions trading scheme. 
The establishment of new payments for 
ecosystem services – as environmental 
externalities are eventually integrated into 
the accounting of local and national 
economies – will create future 
opportunities for revenue. 
However, while these revenue streams 
are constitutive of an EIB’s potential 
return on investment, this revenue should 
not be confused with the EIB itself, for 
two reasons. First, the bond structure of 
the EIB enables it to incorporate these 
various revenue streams, potentially 
combining income from both private and 
government sectors. For example, a 
hypothetical EIB that focuses on the 
outcome of reduced sediment yield in 
waterways could incorporate government 
subsidies for erosion control, carbon 
credits from green infrastructure, 
payments from private hydropower 
utilities for reduced sediment-related 
damage to turbines, and payments from 
fisheries companies for reducing sediment 
in sensitive spawning grounds. (As 
discussed below, this complexity involves 
a trade-off with transactional risk, 
however, by increasing the number of 
stakeholders involved.) Second, EIBs are 
structured to provide ex ante financing to 
fund the original intervention, even 
though the revenue streams that constitute 
the return on investment might not 
mature for several years. So, for example, 
while carbon markets enable ex post 
performance-based payments for carbon 
sequestration, an EIB enables ex ante 
financing for the creation of carbon sinks 
by involving investors who bear the 
burden of failure if carbon isn’t 
sequestered.
Finally, the environmental focus of 
EIBs also increases the likelihood of 
successful standardisation. Again, this 
point of distinction between EIBs and 
SIBs should not be overstated, because 
local contingencies can upset the expected 
outcomes of environmental interventions, 
such as the influence of local soils or 
microclimates on the growth of 
vegetation, or water quality in a specific 
catchment. However, environmental 
phenomena are still relatively more 
amenable to general explanation than 
social phenomena, where the dynamics of 
local history and culture, the contingencies 
of one-off events and particular 
individuals, and the reflexive capacity of 
human action can have a profound 
influence on actual outcomes. As 
discussed earlier, the empirical record 
does not yet support the hypothesis that 
SIBs can ‘achieve scale’, but there are 
reasons to expect that EIBs might do 
better in this regard, because causal 
relationships between intervention and 
outcome are more likely to hold across a 
range of sites. 
Risks and limitations
EIBs are an attractive proposition. But like 
any funding model, impact bonds have 
risks and limitations. Some of these are 
tolerable, some surmountable through 
good design, and some are questions for 
political or strategic judgement. But it is 
important to bear these issues in mind to 
minimise surprises for participants and 
to increase the opportunity for designing 
solutions.
Chief among these issues are the 
transaction costs involved in establishing 
an impact bond: that is, the time, labour 
and associated expenses involved in 
identifying contracting parties, 
negotiating contracts, and monitoring 
and evaluating outcomes. As discussed 
above, the establishment of EIBs is 
plausibly less resource intensive than of 
SIBs, because tools and methods for 
environmental monitoring and evaluation 
often already exist. However, this does not 
forestall the basic logistical difficulties of 
developing complex contracts between 
multiple stakeholders that involve large 
sums of money. Of course, these 
difficulties – and associated risks – will 
also become greater the more stakeholders 
are involved, which creates a trade-off 
with the temptation to enlist multiple 
outcome funders. These difficulties are 
likely to be greater than for most output-
based contracts, where government pays 
for services outright, although perhaps no 
greater than for existing pay-for-
performance arrangements, such as the 
purchasing of ex post carbon credits. 
Thus, it is possible that the initial 
advantage of an EIB will not be overall 
fiscal savings, even if its environmental 
interventions are undertaken at less cost 
than by output-based contracts (see 
Wilkinson and Jeram, 2015, p.7). The 
... it is possible that the initial 
advantage of an EIB will not be overall 
fiscal savings; even environmental 
interventions are undertaken more cost 
effectively by output-based contracts ...
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advantages, rather, are the redistribution 
of risk away from outcome funders and 
the encouragement of innovation, as well 
as the long-run savings if the EIB is 
successfully standardised and replicated 
elsewhere.
Other issues arise from the shift of 
accountability from outputs to 
outcomes, and especially toward 
protecting investments. This addresses a 
longstanding critique of government 
intervention being overly focused on 
process rather than results, but raises the 
possibility of new tensions and perverse 
incentives. As Balboa notes, EIBs might 
not result in long-term solutions to 
environmental problems, because 
payment is triggered by short-term 
outcomes which won’t always be long-
lasting (Balboa, 2016, pp.36-9). Similarly, 
the narrow metric-based focus of EIBs 
creates little incentive to tackle the 
underlying political or economic causes 
of environmental harms. Indeed, investors 
could conceivably have an interest in 
perpetuating an environmental harm, or 
even causing an environmental harm, in 
order to profit from its amelioration 
through an EIB. Such possibilities 
highlight the importance of being prudent 
in choosing which problems to address 
with EIBs and judicious in choosing 
impact targets. 
Generally, the above considerations 
illustrate why impact bonds are not 
appropriate for core sectoral funding, nor 
as a general substitute for existing funding 
mechanisms. This is well-recognised 
within the SIB literature, even among SIB 
advocates (see Wilkinson and Jeram, 2015, 
pp.5-6; Dear et al., 2016, p.21; Gustafsson-
Wright, Gardiner and Putcha, 2015, pp.3-
4). It is best to think of EIBs as one tool in 
the toolbox, as a funding mechanism that 
is well-suited to certain types of problem, 
especially those where there is a lack of 
upfront capital to intervene immediately, 
where the intervention focus is 
preventative, where there is scope for 
innovation or more rigorous management, 
and where there is scope for more cost-
effective service provision and avoided 
future costs (Hall, Lindsay and Judd, 2017, 
p.10). 
Conclusion
EIBs are a plausible funding instrument 
which align with various prevailing 
public policy preferences: forward 
liability accounting, cost-effective service 
provision, use of performance targets, 
informational richness, an openness to 
innovation, and a preference for public–
private partnerships. Accordingly, EIBs 
deserve to be considered as a viable 
funding option for environmental 
interventions in the present day. EIBs 
might even serve as a pathbreaker for 
SIBs, as a proof of viability for the impact 
bond model generally, which avoid some 
of the specific ethical and methodological 
complications faced by SIBs.
Discovering which environmental 
problems the EIB model is suited to 
solving will involve trial and error. 
Fortunately, error will often be identified 
at the negotiation phase, because the 
financial risks for investors necessitate a 
robust actuarial analysis. But even if an 
EIB is not suitable for addressing a specific 
environmental problem, this does not 
mean that the environmental problem is 
not worth solving. On the contrary, EIBs 
are one of many funding instruments, 
which are especially well-suited to 
bridging the gap between the non-
simultaneous exchange of investment and 
outcome. If an EIB is not suited to 
addressing a certain environmental 
problem, then we should be asking 
ourselves how else we should be solving it.
1 The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewer for 
this specific formulation, as well as wider comments that 
improved this article.
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